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II.

COUNTRY AND AREA STUDIES

ASIA
LEGAL AID IN ASIA:

a Basic Human Right?*
Clarence J. Dias**

1. From Legal Aid to Legal Resources: Into the "Alternative"
Development Decade of the Eighties
During the 1960s and 1970s, Asia witnessed a significant expansion
of legal aid programs sponsored by government, professional or social
work agencies. Legal aid in developing countries has had its roots in the
tradition that it is the responsibility of the legal profession to provide
legal services to all, regardless of financial position. Jurisprudential concepts of "equality before law," "equal protection of law" and "rule of
law" have provided, in the past, the rationale for legal aid in Asia.
In most Asian countries during the years after independence, however,
there began to emerge a new interest in legal aid as an instrument for
achieving distributive justice. This interest responded to growing political
and social pressures within these countries for a more egalitarian as well
as a more prosperous society. But there was considerable skepticism as
to whether expanded programs of legal aid for the poor would measurably
remedy the poverty of low-income groups in developing societies. A more
realistic view was that such programs might contribute to the economic
well-being of the poor through a more effective implementation of social
welfare legislation and through an elimination of employment discrimination. But such legal aid programs could only marginally attack the
problems of unemployment, landlessness, and lack of education: the
underlying causes for the pervasive poverty of developing societies. Thus,
legal aid movements in Asia seemed, initially, unwilling to shift from a
conventional jurisprudential rationale based on "equality" to a more
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socially significant (and more radical in terms of political economy)
jurisprudential rationale based on "equitable redress" of historical inequities.
In his keynote inaugural address at the Sixth Lawasia Conference
(held at Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1979) an eminent Philippine lawyer, Jose
Diokno, described the post-independence situation in Asia in the following
words:
In far too many [countries of Asia] trade unions and associations of
farmers, fishermen, urban poor and students are undermined, their
leaders hounded or imprisoned; women are exploited for vice; labour
is kept cheap as an attraction for multinational investment; academic
freedom is seriously curtailed; whole communities are uprooted to
facilitate military operations or economic projects; and while millions
are spent on the military and on infrastructure for tourism and for
commerce, the vast masses of the people have nowhere to live but in
miserable hovels, numb with hunger, wracked by disease, condemned
to a near-mindless existence.
With some notable exceptions, we of the law have refused to see or
to concern ourselves with this stark reality other than by providing
free legal aid-the lawyer's way of giving alms to the poor. This is
no longer enough.
Asia is in turmoil but it is the turmoil of life, not death; of the
movement of people struggling, sometimes successfully and sometimes
not, but always with single-minded determination, to create a better,
more human-and more humane-society for themselves and their
children; and if we of the law are to play a meaningful part in this
struggle, we must use every resource of knowledge, of experience and
of skill that Asian lawyers have to offer.
Jose Diokno's call for Asian lawyers to "use every resource" in the
struggle against mass impoverishment has been echoed several times in
other countries in Asia.
Speaking at the Silver Jubilee Celebration of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights at the Banaras Hilton University, W. Paul Gormsley
argued:
Since India... has already completed 25 years of independence, the
question may be raised whether or not the Fundamental Rights enshrined in our Constitution have any meaning to the millions of our
people to whom food, drinking water, timely medical facilities and
relief from disease and disaster, education and job opportunities still
remain unavailable.
A response to this question was provided in a judgment of the Indian
Supreme Court by then-Justice Bhagwati (now Chief Justice of the Su-
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preme Court for all Indians and indeed for all in India) who articulated
a concept of law as a resource in the struggles of the poor against
conditions of abject poverty:
Large numbers of men, women and children who constitute the bulk
of our population are today living a sub-human existence in conditions
of abject poverty; utter grinding poverty has broken their back and
sapped their moral fibre. They have no faith in the existing social and
economic system. What civil and political rights are these poor and
deprived sections of humanity going to enforce? The only solution for
making civil and political rights meaningful to these large sections of
society would be to remake the material conditions and restructure the
social and economic order so that they may be able to realize their
economic, social and cultural rights.
Justice Bhagwati goes on to initiate reforms supporting such a restructuring of the social and economic order, by reforming the structures of
administration of justice:
The time has now come when the courts must become the courts for
the poor and struggling masses of this country. They must shed their
character as upholders of the established order and the status quo.
They must be sensitised to the need of doing justice to the large
masses of people to whom justice has been denied by a cruel and
heartless society for generations. ...
So far the courts have been used only for the purpose of vindicating
the rights of the wealthy and the affluent. It is only these privileged
classes which have been able to approach the courts for protecting
their vested interests. It is only the moneyed who have so far had the
golden key to unlock the doors of justice. But, now for the first time
the portals of the court are being thrown open to the poor and the
down-trodden, the ignorant and the illiterate, and their cases are
coming before the courts through public interest litigation which has
been made possible by the recent judgment delivered by this Court.
Millions of persons belonging to the deprived and vulnerable sections
of humanity are looking to the courts for improving their life conditions and making basic human rights meaningful for them.
Reforming procedural laws relating to locus standi, so as to make it
easier to initiate "public interest litigation" on behalf of the poor masses,
is indeed a most necessary first step. But throwing open to the poor the
portals of the court is not enough. The poor must be assured of the legal
resources needed to enter such portals and effectively challenge structures
that perpetuate their impoverishment. In several Asian countries, innovative legal aid 'programs have sought to generate such legal resources for
the poor.
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!1.

Legal Aid in Indonesia: the contribution of the Lembaga Bantuan
Hukum (LBH)

The decade spanning the mid-seventies has witnessed a dramatic growth
of legal aid organizations in Indonesia. (See the article by Mulya Lubis,
infra this Volume.) Adnan Buyung Nasution (one of the pioneers of legal
aid in Indonesia) estimates that at least seventy percent of all existing legal
aid organizations (including the LBH which he heads) were established during
this period. Concrete steps to establish legal aid organizations in Indonesia
began in 1967-68, as a strong reaction by a few intellectuals, journalists
and human rights activists, against a wave of preventive detentions, arrests
and other forms of repression launched by the government. However,
with the controlled opening towards political freedom by the New Order
government of General Suharto, legal aid began to become more closely
linked with national development policy. The New Order government has
promulgated a development strategy of "equitable distribution." The State
Policy Guidelines of 1978 (GBHN) gave fullest expression to this strategy
by asserting that the policy of the New Order government was "to open
the main path of equitable distribution of opportunity to obtain justice."
The process of implementing the national development plan has generated
a number of side-effects, however. Foremost among these has been the
forcible eviction of people from lands they had traditionally occupied and
worked, simply because the policy of town development (in Jakarta, for
example) so decreed. There was thus an explosion in the need of the
people, especially the poor, to obtain justice based upon regularized,
institutionalized settlements. This need stimulated the growth of legal aid
organizations in Indonesia. The growth of legal aid organizations in
Indonesia, in turn, has stimulated efforts for structural changes aimed at
the goal of a more just society. With the spread of legal aid organizations,
more possibilities were opened up for the poor to obtain legal services
and thus the opportunity to receive justice. Increased legal aid activity
has had a subsequent effect on governmental authorities and legal aid
practitioners alike. Both have been rendered more sensitive and responsive
to the legal needs of the poor. The growth of legal aid organizations has
provided increased opportunities for making the laws more effective and
for institutionalizing all forms of participation in this process. This growth
has also intensified efforts towards law reforms in Indonesia.
The official perspective emanating from the New Order government
(as stated in the GBHN) envisaged a narrow, "traditional," "legalistic"
approach to legal aid. In the words of Mulya Lubis (a prominent legal
scholar and legal aid activist), "in the government's conceptualization of
the Development Trilogy, law comes after the distribution of economic
growth and stability." Both law and justice have been placed at the very
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end of the "eightfold Path of Distribution" in the government's formulation,with "stability" receiving greatest emphasis over distribution and
justice. This official conception of law and justice led to a traditional
and individualistic conception of legal aid. In Indonesia, this individualistic
concept of legal aid has been described by Mulya Lubis as follows:
The ...

[concept] is one which is basically in line with the existing

legal system. Here the concept implies legal aid in any individual case
where a defence is justified in the eyes of the law. The main emphasis
is on the law itself, and the law is always regarded as neutral or
egalitarian. Often, however, law is not justice. In these instances, to
view the law as neutral is to benefit those who have wealth and power
at the cost of the poor masses. From this perspective, legal aid has
no power to achieve justice. 'Justice' is caught in its own orbit and
becomes static; in fact, it turns into injustice.
Not surprisingly, more and more of those involved in the legal aid
movement in Indonesia have become critical of the individualistic concept
of legal aid. This critical perspective evolved as a reaction to the political,
economic and social realities unfolding in the Indonesian mode of development. In particular, the new injustices are seen as accompanying the
workings of a legal system responsive only to the needs and wants of the
upper levels of the Indonesian social structure. There thus emerged an
alternative concept of legal aid in Indonesia. This concept of structural
legal aid can best be described in the words of its two main authors. As
Mulya Lubis puts it:
The concept of structural legal aid is tied to the destruction of injustices
in the social system. It is directed not merely towards aiding individuals
in specific cases, but towards an emphasis on cases which have a
structural impact. Legal aid becomes the power to move in the direction
of restructuring social order so that a more just pattern of relationships
can be established. Law, in and of itself, cannot address the question
of injustice. Indeed, it often strengthens the status quo because it is
obliged to be neutral. Once one accepts that society is neither just nor
egalitarian, then one must reject neutrality in favour of supporting the
weak in their confrontation with the strong. Structural legal aid,
therefore, places itself on the side of the weak who form the majority
of the population. The legal struggle must be oriented towards creating
a law that is supportive of the weak.
Buyung Nasution elaborates the concept of structural legal aid further:
Structural legal aid shall consist of a series of programmes, aimed at
bringing about changes, both through legal means and in other lawful
ways, in the relationships which form the bases of social life, towards
more parallel and balanced patterns. This is the essential pre-condition
for the development of laws which provide justice for the majority of
the poor in Indonesia.
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At the operational level, structural legal aid must reach out to
rural as well as urban areas; it must actively search out those cases to
defend or initiate which most involve the public's collective interest,
and those cases, undertaken in the interests of the poor, which create
the opportunity for providing legal education to that broad public of
labourers, peasants and fishermen.
On the societal level, therefore, structural legal aid is a growing
power by means of which legal aid activities can positively influence
and create conditions for law development fitting the people's needs.
In 1978, at a National Legal Aid Workshop held for all legal aid
organizations in the country, the structural legal aid concept was adopted
as the guiding principle for the work of all participating legal aid groups.
In 1980, at a second National Legal Aid Workshop, the concept was
developed further. At that workshop, a formulation was agreed which
stated that the main objective of structural legal aid is "conscientization"
as a means to gradually change the unjust social structure. Clearly,
conscientization must be accompanied by organizational efforts as well.
Structural legal aid faces many constraints in Indonesia. Beyond the
courtroom, legal aid activists encounter difficulties in their conscientization
programs, their research, and their teaching. The government frequently
denies them permission to engage in research which would bring them
into close touch with the masses. Political cases are insulated from legal
aid, since legal aid lawyers are not allowed to handle cases where subversion charges have been brought against the defendants. There are significant procedural obstacles, too. The New Code of Criminal Procedure
(HAP) states that legal aid lawyers may observe the course of initial
interrogation of defendants, but they cannot be physically present at the
time of interrogation. In many police stations, interrogation rooms have
a glass partition which permits legal counsel to see what is happening but
not to hear. As Lubis puts it, "If HAP seems to provide a door through
which legal aid can be rendered, it remains a closed door, even if it is a
transparent one." The government is concerned that an unopposed legal
aid movement can become an alternative power base. For this reason, it
has attempted to co-opt the movement by taking the initiative to unify
all legal aid organizations under one umbrella organization. Similar tactics
have been used to control organizations of workers, farmers, journalists,
and the youth. Centralization simplifies control and facilitates co-optation.
But despite the above constraints, structural legal aid is alive and well
in Indonesia. In the words of Buyung Nasution:
The concept is being implemented through a variety of programmes
and actions which, hopefully, will be able to raise various forms of
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active participation by the masses-imprisoned as they are by structures
of poverty and injustice-in the search for a more just social life.
Ill.

Legal Aid in the Philippines: the Contribution of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG)

The experience in the Philippines is very similar to that in Indonesia,
so far as legal aid is concerned. Jose Diokno, perhaps the most prominent
legal aid activist and human rights lawyer in the Philippines during the
past decade and a half, describes the following trend in the Philippines.
Before martial law, legal aid was apolitical. The Philippine political system
was a functioning democracy with a constitution and laws that respected
human rights, an independent judiciary, a socially-concerned legislature,
and a press that was among the most liberal in the world. Given these
conditions, relatively few lawyers questioned the system but strove instead
to make the system work as it should. Legal aid concentrated on enforcing
legal rights, with occasional proposals to amend the law.
Martial law brought about a dramatic and dismal change. Jose Diokno
describes these changes:
By destroying all semblance of democracy; by abolishing Congress and
impairing both the independence and the powers of the Judiciary; by
controlling all communications media and managing the news; by
stifling criticism except when it was ineffective; by outlawing strikes,
peaceful public meetings, and student councils; by hounding and
harassing lawyers, leaders and organizers of trade unions and of
student, peasant and slum dweller organizations; by resorting to arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions under inhuman conditions without
charges or trial, torture, degradation and executions formally unofficial
but officially sanctioned of what it is pleased to call "subversives";
by justifying itself with the assertion that "western-style" democracy
is not fitted in the Philippine temperament, needs, traditions and
values, although that system had functioned, with more or less success,
for the past 70 years - in short, by spreadinga chilling climate of fear
over the nation and by steadily militarizing social institutions, martial
law has led lawyers and laymen to question not only the political
system of martial rule, but even the social, economic, military, and
cultural structures, national and international, that led to martial law
and nurture, sustain and prolong it. As a consequence, martial law
added a new dimension to legal aid: by politicizing lawyers and laymen,
it has politicalized legal aid.
Legal aid practitioners in the Philippines have been adapting to martial
law society and have sought to develop an approach to legal aid "in a
neo-colonial, dependent, developing society under authoritarian rule."
Spearheading this effort has been FLAG, under the very active leadership
of Jose Diokno. FLAG initially concentrated on defending political pris-
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oners, but today continues not only in defending such prisoners but also
"the poor, the dispossessed and the oppressed whose struggles for justice
expose them to arrest and detention." FLAG has evolved what may
perhaps be termed a meta-legal approach to legal aid. Jose Diokno explains
this approach by contrasting it with the traditional approach to legal aid:
Legal aid has traditionally viewed its function as providing legal
solutions to legal problems of the poor by indicating their legal rights.
This is a valuable function in itself: every triumph of justice is cause
for celebration. Unfortunately, legal aid limited to this traditional
function contributes little, if anything, to development .... The reason
is that traditional legal aid accepts uncritically the basic rightness of
the legal order and of the social system and institutions within which
it operates. .

.

. Its thrust is to uphold the law, not to transform

society. Its method for legal change is gradual and incremental, not
abrupt and radical. But development is social change, often fundamental and rapid. So traditional legal aid is of limited value to
development.
Traditional legal aid is, in fact, the lawyer's way of giving alms to
the poor. .

.

. Traditional legal aid redresses particular instances of

injustice but does not fundamentally change the structures that generate
and sustain injustice. And like alms, traditional legal aid carries within
it the germ of dependence. .

. Traditional legal aid can retard rather

than promote development: for above all else, development is human
development.
To contribute effectively to development, legal aid should politicalize its traditional function. Legal aid lawyers should determine
whether their clients' legal difficulties are personal problems or social
problems, that is, whether they affect only their clients or an entire
social sector or community. If the latter, they should involve their
clients in seeking the specific social cause of the legal problems, the
particular social structure and social forces that generate them, and
together attempt to workout both legal and social solutions. The
resulting awareness of the social causes of injustice will evoke the
determination on the part of lawyer and client alike to change law
and society to correct injustice. And that is the beginning of development.
Social awareness can be heightened if legal aid makes full use of
its educative function. By publishing legal primers in the language of
the people, by training paralegals, by conferences with clients, and,
insofar as possible, by the way litigation is conducted, legal aid lawyers
can teach people not only what their legal rights are, but also what
these rights should be; and, equally important, how inadequate existing
legal processes and institutions often are to vindicate those rights, and
why they are inadequate.
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Heightened awareness of problems and causes, however, will not
lead to action - in fact, it can lead to apathy - unless it is coupled
with awareness of possessing power to act. So legal aid lawyers should
encourage the people they serve to organize themselves and act collectively with others similarly situated; and to invent and use meta-legal
tactics, mass actions that transcend ordinary legal procedures without
openly defying existing law, in order to exert pressure for change in
law and society.
FLAG's approach to legal aid reiterates the following core principles:
a)
Legal aid lawyers must strive to be constantly aware of what
their clients want and help them get what they want.
b)
Legal aid must be critical and creative. It must take advantage
of every occasion to arouse the conscience of those in power to
the inhumanity of the system they maintain and how it contradicts the very values they proclaim; and by thus weakening their
belief in their righteousness, to dispose them to do justice and
accept change.
c)
Legal aid should not limit its advocacy to individual rights. It
should seek to vindicate collective rights as well.
d)
One danger should zealously be guarded against: the tendency
to direct the activities of legal aid clients. Legal aid lawyers
must always be conscious that their role is purely supportive.
Their task is to carry out decisions of those they serve to the
extent that this can be done legally, not to make decisions for
them.
The FLAG approach to legal aid is very vitally concerned with the
concepts of development and justice. So far as development is concerned,
the priority is human development above all else. Although legal aid can
contribute to human development, its contribution will not be decisive.
The lesson learned is that, to win justice, the poor, the dispossessed and
the oppressed-who are the people-must rely not on legal aid, but on
their own organized efforts. In the end, justice will be won only by social
liberation. And, to be real, liberation must be self-liberation.
So far as justice is concerned, the emphasis is on a Filipino concept
of justice. As Jose Diokno urges, by turning in on their own society,
Filipinos will find "that there is a Filipino concept of justice; that it is a
highly moral concept, intimately related to the concept of right; that it is
similar to, but broader than, western concepts of justice, for it embraces
the concept of equity; that it is a discriminating concept distinguishing
between justice and right, on the one hand, and law and argument, on
the other; that its fundamental element is fairness; and that it eschews
privilege and naked power." This concept of justice reiterates that people
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as national communities have three basic rights: the right to survive; the
right to external and internal sovereignty; and the right to development.
Lawyers, in the Philippines, must address twin tasks. First, they should
work to ensure that law does not itself become a mechanism through
which social injustice is committed. This injustice could come about in
three ways: first, by not having a system of law at all, written or unwritten,
or one so flawed that people do not know what their legal rights and
duties are; second, by not enforcing law fairly; and third, by enacting
law that does not pursue the social values that constitute the Filipino
vision of a just society, or that adopts means which subvert those values.
Moreover, lawyers must strive to ensure that law does become a
mechanism through which social justice is achieved. In the stirring words
of Jose Diokno:
To attain the Filipino concept of social justice, laws, policies and
institutions must, besides promoting respect for individual and collective human rights, also consciously strive, by effective means:
One, to eradicate poverty, at first in its most degrading forms and
effects and afterwards in all its forms;
Two, to select a means of developing and using our natural
resources, our industries and our commerce to achieve a self-directed,
self-generated, and self-sufficient economy, in order to produce enough
to meet, at first, the basic material needs of all and, afterwards, to
provide an increasingly higher standard of living for all, but particularly for those with lower incomes, and to provide them with enough
leisure to participate creatively in the development and enjoyment of
our national culture; and
Three, to change those relations and structures of relations betweeni
man and man, between groups, and between communities that cause
or perpetuate inequality, unless that inequality is necessary to improve
the lot of the least favored among our people and its burden is borne
by those who heretofore have been most favored.
These standards embody two different principles: the first, a
principle of reparation that looks back to repair the injustice inflicted
by society on the poor and the oppressed; and the second and third,
a principle of change that looks forward to effect the internal and
external revolutions of which Mabini wrote, in order to attain the
aspiration that Jacinto articulated: that a Filipino's worth, who he is,
should not depend on what he has.
The above approach to legal aid, pioneered by Jose Diokno, is
vigorously pursued by FLAG. Moreover, the seeds sown by FLAG have
blossomed in Filipino hearts and minds alike. Other social action groups
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in, the Philippines, such as INDEX (with its monograph on Career Paths
in Alternative Law: Towards a More Just and Human Society), BATAS
(with its series of "paralegal" training workshops for development workers), PROCESS (with its legal resource development programs), and the
Movement for Alternative Law in the Philippines, are forging ahead under
extremely adverse conditions on the trail blazed by Jose Diokno and
FLAG.
IV.

Social Action Litigation: the Indian Contribution

The birth of social action litigation (SAL) in India has been well
chronicled by Upendra Baxi (a legal activist who has played no small role
in both the conception and midwifing of SAL):
During the 1975-76 emergency, legal aid to the people was one of the
key points of the 20-point programme launched by Indira Gandhi, to
which Justices Krishna lyer and Bhagwati, themselves deeply committed to the spread of the legal aid movement, readily responded. They
led a nationwide movement for the promotion of legal services. They
organized legal aid camps in distant villages; they mobilized many a
high court of justice to do padayatras(long marches) through villages
to solve people's grievances. They sought, through 'camps' and lokadalats (people's courts) to provide deprofessionalized justice. They
also, in their extracurial utterances, called for a total restructuring of
the legal system, and in particular of the administration of justice.
As a result of the activities described above, several Supreme Court
and High Court judges became exposed to problems of the poor and
suffering and this laid the basis for the judicial populism needed to give
birth to SAL. The immediate period following the end of the Emergency
witnessed considerable euphoria at the return of liberal democracy. Moreover, the historically unprecedented period of repression during the Emergency served to radicalize marginally the middle classes and professional
groups, including judges. Thus, SAL may be seen as an expiratory
syndrome, as an aspect of post-Emergency catharsis: with judges, lawyers
and the press seeking to vindicate themselves and reestablish their claims
to moral leadership. In the post-Emergency period, the Supreme Court
of India devised SAL as a means of throwing open its portals to "the
poor and the downtrodden, the ignorant and the illiterate." This was
done by reforming procedural rules relating to locus standi, to enable the
bringing of virtual class actions; by creation of "epistolary" jurisdiction
invoked by the writing of letter-petitions to the court; and by the creation
of ad hoc sociolegal commissions to help the court investigate the facts
set out in the letter-petitions. The court was also in the process of evolving
a new constitutional jurisprudence; one that breathed life into the fun-
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damental rights' provisions of the Indian Constitution. The results of this
wave of judicial populism and judicial activism were unprecedented, as is
described by Upendra Baxi:
Under trial as well as convicted prisoners, women in protective custody,
children in juvenile institutions, bonded and migrant labourers, unorganised labourers, untouchables and scheduled tribes, landless agricultural labourers who fall prey to faulty mechanization, women who are
bought and sold, slum dwellers and pavement dwellers, kins of victims
of extrajudicial executions-these and many more groups now flock
to the Supreme Court seeking justice.
They come with unusual problems, never before so directly confronted by the Supreme Court. They seek extraordinary remedies,
transcending the received notions of separation of powers and the
inherited distinctions between adjudication and legislation on the one
hand and administration and adjudication on the other. They bring,
too, a new kind of lawyering and a novel kind of judging.
They also bring a new kind of dialogue on the judicial role in a
traumatically changeful society.
Much of SAL, in its earliest phase, arose from letters written by
individuals to then-Justice P.N. Bhagwati, in his twin capacities as a
Justice of the Supreme Court and as Chairman of the National Committee
for the Implementation of Legal Aid Schemes (CILAS). Initially, SAL
emerged in India through an uncoordinated use of law by diverse legal
activists in the universities, the bar, the bench, and the media. For a
review of the range and scope of SAL in India we turn once again to
Upendra Baxi:
a)
Four law professors issued an open letter to the Chief Justice
of India sharply criticising its decision acquitting police constables accused of committing rape of a tribal woman within
the confines of a police station, on the specious ground that
because she did not resist she must have consented to sexual
intercourse. This created a nationwide controversy, led swiftly
to a bill proposing an amendment of the criminal law relating
to rape, and a protest march by women's organizations to the
Supreme Court seeking a review of the decision.
b)
The Supreme Court of India, acting on complaints by or on
behalf of prisoners, has revolutionised, normatively at least,
prison jurisprudence.
c)
Journalists have sought intervention of the Court to prevent the
buying and selling of women (the Kamala case), the torture of
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Naxalites in Madras jails, the importation for carnal use of
children in a Kanpur prison, and seeking full investigation into
extra-judicial investigation of police' encounters' with dacoits
resulting in extra-judicial executions of people in the rural areas
of Indian states.
Public-spirited lawyers have questioned with remarkable success
d)
the long incarceration of people awaiting trial for crimes carrying
maximum sentences often under half the period of pre-trial
detention already served.
e)
A Bombay-based lawyer group has persuaded the Supreme Court
to admit a petition claiming that pavement dwellers in Bombay
have a fundamental right under the Constitution to dwell on
pavements and has filed a writ claiming access to clean and
hygienic drinking water for villagers in Maharashtra.
f)
An agonised Supreme Court is proceeding to fix culpability for
the blinding of undertrials in Bihar and has ordered a number
of compensatory measures.
g)
Two law professors have filed writ proceedings for violation of
constitutional rights of women detained in a protective home
for woinen in Agra and for cruel and sadistic torture of eleven
young persons in Madhya Pradesh jails.
h)
A legal sociologist has successfully moved the Court to secure
expeditious trial of four boys under detention for seven to eight
years for a crime they did not commit.
SAL, although well institutionalized within the Indian judiciary, is
still very much in its infancy. Nevertheless, an assessment can be made
of its achievements. Upendra Baxi has recently undertaken precisely such
an assessmentAmong the gains of social action litigation are: the heightened sensitivities to injustice on the part of a cross-section of the elite, increasingly insistent claims for accountability of the ruling classes and
dominant political institutions, a gradual, pro-people renovation of
judicial process and values, emergence of a special kind of confidence
in the judiciary in its unequal battle with administrative deviance, and
crystallisation of informed consensus on the need for fundamental
reform of the legal system.
In SAL we are witnessing a virtual social revolution under law and
this is especially marked with regard to the courts and to legal aid. So
far as the courts are concerned, SAL has truly revolutionized the judicial
process to make it: more proactive, less intimidating and more accessible,
more inquisitorial and more active in the fact-gathering process, more
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effective in securing the accountability of bureaucrats and public officials,
and more concerned with monitoring post-judgment compliance.
So far as legal aid is concerned, the impact of SAL is very clearly
visible in the Bill, soon to be introduced in Indian Parliament, to establish
a National Legal Aid Program for India. The Bill provides support not
only for social action litigation but also for a wide range of non-litigation
activities ranging from conciliation to legal literacy and paralegal training
programs. The future of legal aid in India seems very much linked with
that of SAL, and, indeed, the preamble to the National Legal Services
Bill stresses that the prime objective of legal aid in India is to promote
the "revolutionary use of law for securing social justice to the common
people."
V.

A Legal Resources Approach: an Asian Alternative to Legal Aid
In India, Indonesia and the Philippines, legal activists have moved
from a concept of legal aid (with its patronizing connotations) through a
concept of legal services (emphasizing law and lawyers as needing to be
in the service of the poor) to a concept of legal resources (emphasizing
law as a resource in the empowerment of the impoverished).
The legal resources approach differs in many ways from conventional
notions of legal aid delivered by professionals. Legal aid programs designed and operated entirely by professional lawyers are limited to provision of a narrow range of largely court-centered services to individuals
(rather than to groups and collective needs). These programs (created and
managed ex parte by elites) usually "deliver" "legal aid" on a charitable,
handout basis. Where legal services are controlled and allocated by legal
professionals, programs to provide this help typically reflect "top-down"
efforts, managed by elites, to help the poor for purposes and by means
which are defined by the professionals-to meet needs prioritized by those
who control the program. The "legal aid" lawyers may tend to monopolize
the task of articulating and advocating claims of poor and "ignorant"
clients, or to monopolize the task of identifying the underlying needs of
the client-and the strategies to address those concerns. While poor
families may be individually helped in some ways by this kind of legal
assistance, communities are still left dependent on professionals-and all
too often people remain essentially ignorant of their legal rights and of
different ways they can follow to assert and vindicate them. Moreover,
crucial objectives of "people-centered" development-such as the generation of capacities for "participation" and "self-reliant" determination
of the ends and means of collective action-are often subverted; social
relationships between the poor and those with whom they must contend
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may remain essentially unchanged; and new sources of power are seldom
generated within communities. The legal aid approach may provide access
to law but it seldom encourages people to seek access to justice through
law. The legal resources approach encourages people to seek both, if
necessary, by helping them to understand their existing rights under law
and by helping them to devise their own strategies to bring about reform
of unjust or inadequate laws.
The legal resources approach emphasizes concepts of legal self-reliance,
deprofessionalization, and interest-group advocacy. Legal self-reliance is
to be achieved both through programs seeking to educate specific poverty
communities about their rights and the laws and procedures relevant to
their day-to-day activities so as to enable them to decide for themselves
when and how to take recourse to law and when not to. Deprofessionalization is to be pursued through an attempt to break the legal profession's monopoly over legal knowledge and skills by developing, wherever
appropriate, community-based paralegals. Interest-group advocacy seeks
to enhance countervailing power of organizations of the urban and rural
poor by advocacy of their interests in national centers of decision making
through specialized national and international organizations which work
with local groups.
The legal resources approach, as it has evolved in India, Indonesia
and the Philippines, highlights the following interrelated emphases essential
to an effective program of legal assistance:
a)
Collective and not purely individual rights are emphasized.
b)
Goals of participation and self-reliance in the delivery of
legal assistance are emphasized. As Buyung Nasution espresses
it, "legal aid activists must consciously guard themselves against
the professional elitism of so many lawyers and their organizations must not be separate, or insulated, from the clients they
are intended to serve. To which, Jose Diokno would add a plea
for professional humility. The creation of legal resources for
the poor must, in itself, be a participatory process. People must
determine, for themselves, not only what their essential needs
are, but whether, when and how law may be used to secure
those needs.
c)
Seeking to redress both injustices and inequalities are emphasized, and, more importantly, the social, economic, and
political structures which produce and reproduce such injustices.
Thus legal aid activists must proceed from a jurisprudential
rationale that goes beyond access or equality and encompass
redress of historical inequities.
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d)

Helping develop organizations of victim groups and victim
peoples are emphasized. There is a close complementarity between developing participatory organizations and developing capacities among the rural poor to meet their legal needs themselves.
Individually, the rural poor cannot usually secure the legal
resources needed to press claims for other resources essential to
their needs; only through organization can they gain the necessary knowledge, aggregate their claims and amass the numbers
to press them. In turn, the process of developing organizations
in the face of resistance from vested interests requires organizational capacity to use law and legal resources to defend the
group.
e)
Helping to secure public accountability of bureaucrats and
government officials is emphasized. The Indian experience shows
how effective and important SAL is in combating governmental
lawlessness whose brunt is, inevitably, most acutely felt by the
impoverished and the powerless.
The experience in India, Indonesia and the Philippines also indicates
the importance of legal activists working on law reform to create a
favorable legal environment in three areas:
i) Human rights law is essential for the empowerment of the poor,
for their participation in governance, and to secure their entitlement to resources to meet basic material and non-material
needs.
ii) Redistributive legislation must seek to redress the historically
prevalent, inequitable and grossly skewed distribution of power
and basic resources which typify most Asian societies.
iii) Administrative law must whittle down illegitimate areas of governmental immunity from legal process, and help to secure the
public accountability of government officials, thus minimizing
the abuse of power and the growth of governmental lawlessness.
In most countries in Asia, legal aid has come to be viewed as providing
much more than just one's day in court. We, in Asia, have been developing
uniquely Asian approaches to legal aid which link legal aid intimately
with both justice and human development. Legal aid is no longer a matter
of benign paternalism in Asia; it has emerged as a human right which is
not only being increasingly claimed and asserted but also increasingly
realized. Indeed, for some countries in Asia, legal aid may well prove to
be the harbinger of a legal revolution accompanying and assisting major
social transformation towards a just and humane society.
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